Loop Protocol v1.0 • March 2026

Security Architecture

Autonomous agent operation without sacrificing user custody.

System Architecture
USER DEVICE                    LOOP INFRASTRUCTURE              SOLANA
─────────────                  ───────────────────              ──────
┌──────────────┐               ┌──────────────────┐             
│ Passkey      │               │ Nitro Enclave    │             ┌─────────┐
│ (Secure      │◄─────────────►│                  │◄───────────►│ Vault   │
│  Element)    │  MPC signing  │ Agent runtime    │  Txs        │ Program │
└──────────────┘               │ + key share      │             └─────────┘
                               └──────────────────┘                  │
       │                              │                              │
       │                              │                              ▼
       │                       ┌──────────────────┐             ┌─────────┐
       │                       │ Squads Policy    │◄───────────►│ Policy  │
       └──────────────────────►│ Engine           │             │ Account │
              User approvals   └──────────────────┘             └─────────┘
Core Primitives
Key Management

MPC Threshold Signing

Keys split 2-of-3 via GG18/FROST protocol. Full private key never reconstructed.

ShareLocationPurpose
USERDevice SEAuthorization
AGENTNitro EnclaveAutonomous ops
BACKUPGuardian/HSMRecovery
Trusted Execution

AWS Nitro Enclaves

Isolated VMs with no admin access, no persistent storage, cryptographic attestation.

[01]Enclave image hashed (reproducible)
[02]Hash published to chain + audits
[03]KMS releases keys only if attestation matches
On-Chain Policy

Squads v4 Programmable Custody

Operation Thresholds
capture_rewardsAGENT
stack_lt_1000AGENT
stack_gt_1000AGENT+USER
external_transferAGENT+USER
fiat_extractionAGENT+USER+24H
Default Limits
daily_transfer_limit1,000 Cred
single_tx_limit500 Cred
auto_approve_stack1,000 Cred
settings_delay48h
Recovery

Social Recovery

Guardians3-of-5 + 7d timelock
Inheritance90d inactivity trigger
Device LossPasskey sync via iCloud/Google
Threat Model

In Scope

Loop infrastructure compromise
Malicious or buggy agent behavior
User device loss or theft
User incapacitation or death
Fraudulent value capture claims
Phishing and social engineering

Trust Assumptions

Hardware secure elements (Apple SE, Google Titan)
AWS Nitro attestation primitives
Solana validator consensus
Standard cryptographic primitives
We do not assume Loop's servers are trustworthy.
Capabilities Matrix

What Loop Cannot Do

Access user funds
Zero key shares held
Move user Cred
Requires passkey/guardians
Forge captures
ZK proofs verified on-chain
Block withdrawals
No veto authority
Access enclave memory
TEE isolation
Silent agent updates
Hash changes visible

What Users Can Always Do

View balance
Public chain data
Pause agent
1 sig, immediate
Revoke agent
1 sig, immediate
Withdraw all
1 sig + 24h
Change heir
1 sig + 48h
Guardian recovery
3/5 sig + 7d
Audit Schedule
Q2 2026

Solana Programs

OtterSec
Q2 2026

MPC Integration

Trail of Bits
Q2 2026

Enclave Code

NCC Group
Q3 2026

ZK Circuits

Veridise
Security Teamsecurity@looplocal.io